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DIVINE INTERVENTION AND
THE ORIGIN OF LIFE
Hugh S. Chandler

The 'Intervention Argument' purports to show that God created life on our
planet by supernatural intervention. One of its characteristic premises is the
claim that if things had been allowed to take their 'natural' course, living
organisms would probably not have come into existence here. This paper
clarifies the argument and assesses its worth. The upshot is that its plausibility
depends upon our estimate of the prior probability of God's intervention, and
our guess as to the likelihood that life would have developed naturally on
this planet in the absence of such intervention.

I
We assume that God exists. The Intervention Argument is sometimes offered
as justification for theism; but this adds unnecessary twists and turns to the
basic line of thought. l For now, at least, let's concentrate on the hypothesis
that physical life is brought into existence by divine intervention, and neglect
the problem as to whether there is, or is not, a God of the sort who might
thus intervene.

Lucifer's Problem
God somehow causes the Big Bang. 2 Two or three billion years go by. Various
clusters of galaxies have formed; but there is, as yet, no life, that is to say,
no physicallife. 3 There are, of course, Principalities, Powers, Angels, and so
on. One of the Angels, Lucifer, is trying to figure out whether or not God is
going to produce physical life by intervention.
Lucifer makes the following simplifying assumptions:
(1) If the universe wouldn 'f produce an abundance of living things naturally

(i.e. in the absence of Divine intervention), God will intervene. 4 Hence,
there is no chance that the universe will always be (physically) lifeless.
(2) If the universe would produce an abundance of life naturally (if 'left to
itself,' so to speak) then God will not intervene (in this regard). 5
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The question marks indicate Lucifer's problem. What is a reasonable estimate
of the likelihood that God will intervene in the universe? Or, to put it negatively, what is the likelihood that God will not intervene? The two upper cells
represent the domain of the proposition 'God will intervene.' The upper
left-hand cell represents the domain of the conjunct 'God will intervene even
though abundant life would occur naturally.' There is a zero here because
Lucifer is assuming there is no chance whatsoever that this conjunct is true.
The upper right-hand cell represents the region of the conjunct 'Abundant
life would not occur naturally and God will intervene.' The lower left-hand
cell represents the domain of 'Abundant life would occur naturally and God
will not intervene,' while the lower right-hand cell stands for the domain of
'Abundant life would not occur naturally and God will not intervene.'
Lucifer's simplifying assumptions are, in effect, two conditional probability judgments. Given that abundant life would occur naturally, the probability that God will intervene in the universe is zero, and the probability that
he won't is, of course, one. On the other hand, given that abundant life would
not occur naturally, the probability that God will intervene is one, and the
probability that he won't is zero.
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It must be admitted that it is possible to find this set-up confusing, We are
assuming, or pretending, something which is probably absurd, namely that
God creates the physical universe, lets it run for a while, and then decides
whether or not to intervene,6 He does this by figuring out how much life there
would eventually be in this actual universe if he were to abstain from intervention, The likelihood of his intervening is thus dependent upon what he
foresees would happen, given his non-intervention.
Suppose that God decides not to intervene. What is the likelihood that there
will be abundant life in the universe? Under Lucifer's assumptions, it is
absolutely certain that life would subsequently be abundant. This is certain
since, by hypothesis, God abstains from intervention if, and only if, he foresees that there would be abundant life in the absence of his intervention, and
God doesn't make mistakes.
Obviously, it would be absurd for God to take this as the answer to the
question he asks himself in trying to decide whether or not to intervene. When
God says to himself "Suppose I do not intervene. What would happen then?"
he cannot mean "Suppose I decide, after due deliberation, not to intervene;
what then?" He knows perfectly well he is incapable of miscalculation.
Our pretense is that Lucifer tries to recapitulate God's calculation. He tries
to work out some sort of reasonable assessment of the likelihood that (physical) life would be abundant given God's non-intervention. His problem is not
the one to which the answer is already obvious.
That's enough of that. Here is a start towards formulating some of the
relevant considerations. As an irresponsible shot in the dark, I suppose there
are now something like three hundred million (3 X 108) galaxies in the
universe. 7 Let's pretend this is about all there will ever be.
Consider our own galaxy. It contains roughly one hundred billion (1011)
stars. How many of these stars have planets? The answer is as yet unclear;
but let's assume that about half of them do. On a conservative view, physical
life requires heavy elements-that means that physical life can only occur on
planets belonging to second generation stars (stars formed in part from the
debris of earlier stars).8 The number of candidate planets is thus again cut in
half. Since we are being conservative, we will also assume that life requires
lots of water (as opposed to liquid ammonia, liquid methane, or whatever).
Furthermore, the natural emergence of life, if it can occur at all, can only
occur in a region of 'energy flux.' For this we need a nice source of heat and
a direction in which heat can be lost. (An 'energy flux' is the engine that
propels the formation and subsequent evolution of the complex molecules
necessary to life as we know it.) Let's say we are down to about 107 'good
candidate~ planets. 9
Lucifer can predict all this. (He is good at physics, chemistry, astronomy,
imaginary biology, and big numbers). Now he might ask himself the follow-
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ing question. Given an arbitrary good candidate planet (X), and, say 6 billion
years during which a sizeable portion of its water is in a nice energy flux,
what is the probability that life would emerge on X without supernatural
intervention? [Notice that the problem has shifted temporarily from trying to
estimate the likelihood of abundant life in the universe, or in our galaxy,
given non-intervention in the universe, or in our galaxy, to estimating the
probability of life on a random good candidate planet given non-intervention
on that planet.]
Suppose there is just one chance in a hundred (0.01) that life would develop
on planet X, given that God does not intervene there. [Don't ask me where I
got that number-I just made it upPO] On this supposition, and given that
God does not intervene on X, the probability that life will not develop on X
must be 0.99. Now we can begin to solve Lucifer's problem. Planet X is a
good candidate planet somewhere in our galaxy. For any such planet, the
probability that it would be lifeless throughout its duration in the absence of
divine intervention is 0.99 (or so we are pretending). Hence, given two such
planets, the probability of both o/them being lifeless, given that God doesn't
intervene on either of them, is (0.99 X 0.99) = 0.9801. (The probability of
two independent events is the probability of the first times the probability of
the second. H) But then the probability of natural life occurring on at least
one of the two planets must be (1 - 0.9801) = 0.0199. (The probability of
there being life on at least one is the probability of it not being the case that
both are lifeless.) The probability of natural life occurring on at least one of
three good candidate planets is 1 - (0.99 X 0.99 X 0.99) = 0.0297. As we add
more planets, the likelihood of natural life creeps up. By the time we get to
seventy good candidate planets, the probability of life occurring on at least
one of them (in the absence of divine intervention) is better than fifty/fifty.
Two hundred and thirty planets bring the probability to 0.9. Four hundred
and fifty-nine planets push it to 0.99. Of course we never get absolute certainty (probability 1). Given any number of good candidate planets, there is
still some chance that natural life will not occur on any of them.
This line of thought, by itself, doesn't settle Lucifer's problem. As you
remember, he is trying to figure out whether life is likely to be 'abundant'
given God's non-intervention. How much life is there likely to be?
It seems permissible to assume that most if not all of the alleged 3 X 108
galaxies in the universe are roughly like ours in regard to the proportion of
good candidate planets to bad. On that assumption, it seems reasonable to bet
that the proportion of planets that would naturally have life on them in a
given galaxy tends to approximate the probability of there being natural life
on any given good candidate planet. 12 Consequently, the best bet would be
that the number of planets in our galaxy that would naturally generate life is
roughly one hundred thousand (107 X 0.01) = lOS. If Lucifer's thinking
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mirrors ours, he must conclude that the universe will almost certainly contain
more than enough life, given that God doesn't intervene anywhere (in this
regard). Taking into account the wide margin of error for the super soft
numbers that have been used, let's pretend he decides that the probability of
abundant life occurring naturally in the universe as a whole is about 0.999.
This, plus his assumptions about God's general policy in regard to intervention, leads him to conclude that God probably won't intervene.B The completed diagram of the situation looks like this:
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[The 0.001 at the upper left-hand side of the square represents the probability
that God will intervene (0.001 + 0). Similarly, the 0.001 at the bottom of the
right-hand side represents the probability that abundant life would not occur
naturally.]
How sensitive is this general line of thought to changes in the estimate of
the likelihood of life on a good candidate planet given God's non-intervention
there? Of course if that probability had been put higher (as might quite
reasonably have been done) the likelihood of God's non-intervention could
only go up. The more interesting question is this: how far down must that
estimate go in order to make God's intervention a good bet? Suppose we said
the probability of life arising naturally on a good candidate planet is one in
a million (0.000001). In that case, it would be reasonable to bet that life would
develop on about ten planets in our galaxy (10 7 X 0.000001 = 10), and,
consequently (perhaps) on about 10 X (3 X 108) = 3 X 109 planets in the
universe. According to our somewhat arbitrary stipulation, God would regard
that as skimpy (see footnote 4).
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The Intervention Argument
As I understand it, the Intervention Argument goes as follows. Consider the
situation on planet Earth before there was any life here:
(1) Given that God intervenes to produce life on Earth, there is no chance

at all that there will be no life on Earth. (Hence the conjunct "God
intervenes to produce life on Earth; but life does not occur on Earth"
has zero probability.)
(2) If God does not intervene to produce life on Earth, the probability that
life will occur here is very low.
(3) It is just as reasonable to bet that God will intervene to produce life on
Earth as that he won't. (The reasonable subjective probability is in the
vicinity of fifty-fifty.)14
(4)

But there will be life on Earth.

(5) Consequently it is very likely that God will intervene to produce life on
Earth.
Premise (1) is obviously true; and so is (4).

In regard to (2), presumably Earth was a typical good candidate planet.
Suppose, then, that we stick with my wild (but conservative) guess as to the
probability of life occurring on such a planet in the absence of God's intervention.
Life occurs
on Earth

Life does not
occur on Earth
God does not
interllene Dn
[arth

The argument is, in effect, simply an application of Bayes' theorem to the
data supplied by the premises. 15 We are trying to find the probability of God's
intervention on Earth, given that there is life on earth. Using 'Pr(x I y)' to
mean 'the probability of x given y,' Bayes' theorem says:
Pr(Int

I Ll·f)e =

[Pr(Int) X PreLife

X PreLife lInt)
I Pr(lnt)
I
Int)] + [Pr(Non-Int) X PreLife Non-Int)]

Premise (3) says that Pr(Int) and Pr(Non-Int) are both 0.5. Premise (1) tells
us that PreLife lInt) = 1. And premise (2)-fleshed out by my wild guessgives us that PreLife I Non-Int) = 0.01.

At this point we either do a bit of arithmetic, or try the diagrammatic approach. The following array might be helpful:
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[Those who are puzzled by the numbers in the bottom half of the array might
find it helpful to be reminded that (0.5 X 0.01) = 0.005 and (0.5 X 0.99) =
0.495).]
On these assumptions, the probability of life occurring on Earth (one way
or the other-either naturally or by divine intervention) is 0.505 (i.e. 0.5 +
0.005). Hence, of course the probability of the planet's being lifeless is 0.495.
Now, given that there is life here, what is the probability that God produced
it by intervention? The rather surprising result is that we can be almost certain
that this is what happened (0.5 divided by 0.505 is roughly 0.99).
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on Earth

.99
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But why should we accept premise (3)? That is to say, why should we put
the prior probability of God's intervention on our planet at .5? This seems to
me a serious defect in the argument as stated. According to our story, Lucifer
came to believe that God would almost certainly leave each and every planet
in the universe to its own natural devices in regard to the occurrence, or
non-occurrence, of life. I take it there was nothing special about Earth that
made God particularly eager that there should be life on it. Prior to the
occurrence of life, it was, presumably, just one among the 107 good candidate
planets in our galaxy.
Imagine this situation: God has decided to intervene in the universe in order
to guarantee abundant life. What should his policy of intervention be? There
are all sorts of options. He might, for example, stay close to the alleged
minimum and create life on only 1% of the good candidate planets. On the
other hand, he might go to the other extreme and create life on every single
one of them.
Pretend that if God were to intervene in the universe he would create life
on about 60% of the good candidate planets. Under this pretence, should we
put the prior probability of God's intervention on Earth at 0.6? Certainly not.
In fact, if we accept Lucifer's estimate of the prior probability of God's
intervention in the universe, then the prior probability of God creating life
on Earth would be just 0.0006 (i.e. 0.001 X 0.6).
Let's assume that if God were to intervene in the universe he would create
life on all the good candidate planets. 16 Hence (still following Lucifer) the
prior probability of intervention on a given good candidate planet is 0.001.
This assumption, together with premise (1) and the assumption that the probability of life occurring naturally on Earth was one in a hundred, yields the
following display:
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Now the prior probability of there being life on Earth even though God does
not intervene is .00999 (i.e. 0.01 X 0.999). And the probability of life occurring on our planet (one way or the other) is 0.01099 (i.e. 0.001 + 0.00999).
More importantly, the probability that God has intervened, given that there
is life on Earth, is about nine chances out of a hundred (roughly 0.091). That
is to say, given the existence of life on earth, the best bet by far is that it
occurred naturally (probability: about 0.909).
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The upshot is that the outcome of this probabilistic reasoning depends, in
large measure, upon our estimate of the prior probability of God's intervening
to produce life on Earth. And this, in turn, is dependent upon our estimate of
(a) the prior probability of God's intervention in the universe, and (b) the
percentage of good candidate planets he would decide to intervene upon. If
we judge that the likelihood of life developing on Earth in the absence of
God's intervention is one in a hundred or better, and our estimate of the
probability of God's intervention here is roughly like Lucifer's, we will
conclude that God probably did not intervene to produce life on our planet.
It's a good bet that sketchy formulations of the intervention argument are
often expressions of innocent and understandable intellectual confusion. The
reasoner simply assumes without thought that the prior probability of God's
intervention on our planet is substantially greater than the probability that
life would occur here naturally. (One can easily be unaware of this crucial
assumption when the argument is presented in a sketchy way.) On the other
hand, no doubt, some theists honestly believe that the probability of life
occurring naturally is more or less zero. Given this extremist view, and a
moderate estimate of the prior probability of God's intervention, the argument
would yield the conclusion that God probably intervened. 17
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NOTES

1. I don't recall seeing the argument in print; but, like many people, I have heard it a
good number of times.
2. I assume there was a Big Bang. There is room for some skepticism here.
3. The terms 'alive,' 'life' and 'living' are not sharply defined. We take angels, amoebas,
and mushrooms to be living things, but candle-flames, quartz crystals, and magnetic fields,
to be non-living.
4. There are various problems in regard to this claim. Here are two: (1) What counts as
an 'abundance' of life in this context? (2) Does 'divine intervention' include intervention
by supernatural entities other than God in compliance with his wishes? In regard to the
first problem, let's permit a fairly wide degree of latitude. If the average galaxy contains
less than one hundred life-bearing planets, let's say life is not 'abundant.' If the average
is one hundred thousand (l05) or more, that's plenty. [There are a large number of galaxies
in the universe.] In regard to the second problem, for the sake of simplicity, let's say that
any supernatural intervention undertaken in obedience to God's will counts as 'divine
intervention.' Of course this leaves open the possibility that life might be brought about
by a supernatural entity who is, so to speak, acting on her own, perhaps even as an act of
rebellion. We ignore this possibility.

5. Talk about 'intervention' in what follows is to be understood as intervention in order
to bring it about that there is physical life on a planet or in the universe as a whole.
Repetition of the parenthetical remark 'in this regard' gets tiresome.
6. From the point of view of sober theology, it would probably be better to think of God
first deciding whether to create a universe into which he will intervene or one in which
such intervention will not be necessary, and then creating a universe of the preferable kind.
On this view, the more likely we think it is that abundant life would occur naturally (if
God did not intervene), the more likely we should take it to be that God decided that
non-intervention was preferable.
7. The truth is that there is simply not enough data to justify even a rough guess here.
8. The heavy elements, up to and including iron, were formed in the cores of massive
stars.
9. The general line of thought and some of the numbers in this paragraph are taken from
Paul M. Churchland's Matter and Consciousness, Revised Edition (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988), pp. 170-71. See also Gerald Feinberg and Robert Shapiro, Life Beyond
Earth (William Morrow and Company, New York, 1980) [Churchland recommends this
book]. When (or if) someone comes up with a really plausible story as to how living
organisms were generated by natural processes, it will be possible to make the description
of a 'good candidate' planet much more precise. Perhaps I should also add that the division
of planets into just two kinds (good candidates, and bad) is simplistic. There are gradations
here.
10. A more plausible but much less precise hypothesis would be that the probability of
life occurring naturally on an arbitrarily selected good candidate planet is somewhere
between 0.99 (ninety-nine out of a hundred) and 0.01 (one in a hundred).
11. In fact these events are not entirely independent. For example, the probability of
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there being life on Mars (eventually) is greatly enhanced by the fact that there is intelligent
life on a nearby planet. In the discussion that follows, I disregard this complication (viz.
the tendency of life to spread across nearby habitable planets).
12. My move here is analogous to the move that makes it reasonable to bet that there
will be something/airly close to 50 heads and 50 tails in any given sequence of 100 tosses.
Such sequences will differ in this regard; but the tendency is for them to mirror the
probability of getting heads as against the probability of getting tails on a single toss.
13. If the probability of abundant life occurring naturally is 0.999, then the probability
that abundant life would not occur if the universe were left to its own devices must be
0.001. But then, under Lucifer's assumptions, this must also be the probability that God
will intervene.
14. The alleged grounds for this assessment might be that we have no more reason to
bet one way than the other. In any case, I am going to claim that this assessment is
implausible.
15. The theorem is named after Thomas Bayes, a Presbyterian minister, who did
important early work in the theory of probability.
16. This assumption simplifies computation, and maximizes the probability of God's
intervention on Earth.
17. In writing this paper, I had the help and encouragement of my colleague Robert
McKim.

